- Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
- Book Review | Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within by Shuja Nawaz
- Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
- Crossed Swords : Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
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Crossed Swords book. If anyone has this book in Pdf form, would you please share this book with me on this email address [email protected]?. Crossed mencosulwiemudd.cf - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. "This is by far the fullest and most authoritative analysis yet published of Pakistan and its army and intelligence services."--New York Review of Books. "Timely.
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Book Review. A.H Amin. Crossed Swords is the latest addition to the list of books dealing with. Pakistan Army. Written with an eye on the Western audience by a. PDF | Pakistan Army analysed - Crossed Swords-Book Review ISBN ISBN X. Book Reviews. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords (Oxford University. Press, Karachi , ) by Amna Mahmood. Price: Rs. /- PP. Democracy and military.
The proximity of its vast and often hostile neighbour, India, and the difficulties in establishing a representative democracy in a country so divided by region and ethnicity, meant that the Pakistan Army came to see itself as the bastion of national survival.
Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
When what it regarded as corrupt and self-serving civilian politicians appeared to jeopardise the future, the army had little hesitation about intervention. Despite the succession of coups, military governments [End Page ] , and crackdowns, it is curious that there are so few histories of the army's political role.
Shuja Nawaz has therefore filled a serious gap in the scholarship, and his comprehensive survey is the result of some thirty years of research. However, as someone closely related to the army, through his wife and his brother, he was granted unprecedented access to the archives of the Pakistan Army at Rawalpindi, and to the army's personnel. The result is a detailed and fascinating account of the army, in peace and in wartime, through the lens of one not actually part of the organisation, yet possessed of a thorough appreciation of its ethos.
Given the crucial role the Pakistan Army finds itself playing in the international struggle against insurgency and terrorism, Nawaz's book is a vitally important contribution to our understanding of events in the region of Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province, where American forces now operate.
Nawaz explains how the Pakistan Army functions, its view of civil society, and its record in Pakistan's history. The army, whilst trying the save the nation, has found itself acting as power broker for a variety of competing political groups and running a civilian administration for which it was never trained. Not only did this enmeshing in civil affairs compel the army to defeat its political opponents, often with violence, it also left it ill-equipped to fight external opponents, as examples in and have shown.
Nawaz dwells less on the corruption of the army itself, and there is too little, perhaps, on the excesses of the ISI, the military intelligence branch, but there is a full acknowledgement that the army's interference in politics has actually stunted the democratic development of the country - a point often made by the late Benazir Bhutto.
Fazal thus wrote; 'To the Army's horror, Pakistan during her greatest hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire Was it assumed weakness; or as a result of pressing advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an unfriendly neighbour in distress?
Whatever the reason,Pakistan's reluctance to accept the risks of continuing the war,cost her Kashmir at that time. It was a risk worth taking. In addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area i. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse. In addition the Indians also possessed more than 10 other armoured regiments which were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or Western UP and could move to Kashmir.
We shall see in how Pakistani armour functioned and the reader can keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how Pakistani armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation Venus; had it been ever launched! Fazal does not explain how capture Of Beri Pattan bridge would have led to complete collapse of Indian hold over Kashmir,apart from temporary severing of the line of communication to Poonch.
Greater part of the Central India Horse was at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur area was also within striking range and the battle would have been a hotly contested affair! Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme viewpoint similar to Fazal's when he wrote his book on Pakistan Army.
He merely said that 'On December 30 both sides saw the wisdom of cease-fire'. Lately in an article General K.
M Arif adopted a more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the Kashmir War of was mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a position to fight it successfully summing it up by stating ; 'It is too hazardous a risk to fight a war on ad hoc basis'. There is no doubt that Pakistan was in a favourable position to win the Kashmir War at least till the first week of November.
Mr Jinnah exhibited great Coup de Oeil when he ordered Gracey to employ two brigades and advance with one brigade each towards Jammu and Srinagar. But Mr Jinnah was unlucky in possessing no one like Patel and his Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet proved to be an undoubted failure at least as a war cabinet!
Book Review | Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within by Shuja Nawaz
Mr Jinnah's decision not to have a Pakistani C in C although taken in the best interest of the country and the Army as Mr Jinnah saw it ensured that the British acting C in C procedurally blocked the execution of Mr Jinnah's orders in October to attack Kashmir.
Pakistan was unlucky in having a man like Iskandar Mirza at the Ministry of Defence. Mirza did not advise Mr Jinnah correctly and the fact that he had hardly served in the Army and did not understand military affairs further ensured that Mr Jinnah and the Prime Minister remained as ignorant as they were about military affairs as they were when they were in high school.
It is incorrect to criticise Liaqat for Operation Venus since in December the Indian position was much more secure than in Liaqat can be criticised for not ever visiting Kashmir while the war was on and for not standing by Mr Jinnah in pressurising Gracey in October to order the Army to attack Kashmir.
The Indians were lucky in having comparatively more regular army officers who led from the front and is evident from higher officer casualties among Indian Army officers above the rank of captain vis a vis the Pakistan Army. The treatment of is also very superficial. His use of the term British for the pre period is also factually incorrect as India till was ruled by the English East India Company using mostly its private Bengal Army ,Madras Army,Bombay Army , its private European regiments and some regiments on rent from British Army to conquer ventire India.
Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
In discussion of Martial Races Theory the author totally ignores the fact that Punjab Loyalty in to the British was one of the main reasons why martial races theory was evolved. This is a simple point noted even by British writers like Philip Mason.
The author also fails to note the politically important fact that the English East India Company's army was the knight in shining armour which saved the Muslims of Punjab and settled areas of present Pashtun NWFP from the Sikhs who were using Muslim Mosques as stables gunpowder magazines and plastering their walls with cowdung.
The author talks about martial races theory and thinks that martial races theory was all about Punjab and Frontier as it is now but perhaps does not know that one of martial races theory's most famous exponent Major General Macmunn regarded the Khanzada Rajputs of Firozpur Jhirka as the finest fighting race in India.
The author also fails to note that the Sikhs were in majority in the fighting arms till First World War and were reduced to a minority by being replaced with Punjabi Muslims after First World War because the Punjabi Muslims were regarded as phenomenally loyal , even against Muslims by the British.
Thus the author conveniently ignores two important developments of WW One i. In discussion of Ayub Khan the author totally ignores allegations about Ayub's tacfical timidity in Burma. This incident was discussed by three writers of the time. In an article Brigadier Nur Hussain a reliable authority did state that Ayub Khan was close to General Gracey because they drank together.
Crossed Swords : Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
The authors discussion of old officers is also partial. On page 33 he states that " Akbar Khan who gained notoriety in Kashmir Akbar Khan was the pioneer of Kashmir war but Shuja thinks that he was notorious.
A strange assertion. Mr Jinnah's historic decision of creating two infantry battalions of Bengalis is also not all discussed by the author. It may be noted that Ayub Khan refused to expand the East Bengal Regiment till as a result of which the Bengalis were further alienated for not being given the due share in the armed forces. The authors analysis of origin of officer corps is also superficial.
The author does note the fact that Pakistani SSG captured Indian War Plan on Samba Kathua road before the war actually started but fails to note the fact that it was Pakistan's Military Intelligence led by Director Military Intelligence Brigadier Irshad who refused to give any serious thought to this discovery and dismissed it as an Indian ruse.
The most serious distortion of history committed by Mr Shuja Nawaz is on page when he gives the credit of 25 Cavalry's action of 8th September at Gadgor to Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik. The authority he quotes is Farouk Adam , then a very junior officer and not in 24 Brigade Headquarter.
It must be clarified that a good military historian or analyst's prime motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write "what men did" rather than what "they ought ideally to have done" or what "someone later with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done".
Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation.
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Pure and unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since I maintain as one great master of English prose said that "all history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence is romance"! Battle of Chawinda was thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was essentially "Romance"!
Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality! Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day!
Later heroes were created! I repeat "Heroes were created"!
The hero had to be from the Salt Range however! At least Shuja Nawaz wants it this way!
What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was "casualties"! These were deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy links! How many were killed in the biggest military blunder "Operation Gibraltar"! This is Top Secret! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures!
The real motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to "guard reputations" Now lets talk about the broad front deployment that Shuja Nawaz refers to. There is no doubt that the "broad front deployment" was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him.
It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight!
Shuja Nawaz here in his page book offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig A. A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to "do something" as clearly stated by an authority no less than Pakistan Army's official historian Major General Shaukat Riza,apparently not from Jhelum or from North of Chenab by a twist of fate.
There is no doubt that Nisar did something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! The "Do Something" order by Brig A.
A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry should not have been glorified to something higher by Shuja Nawaz simply on authority of an article written by a person who was a company 2IC in an infantry battalion of 24 Brigade and that too only in We expected something far more profound than this. Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality! Containing a welter of insights into the military mindset, its partnership with the civil bureaucracy and attitude towards the political fraternity, this is a book no serious student of Pakistan can afford to miss.
The result is an insightful study of an institution that has been, and remains, the center of gravity in Pakistan. She went into exile and divided her time between Dubai and London, before returning to Pakistan to challenge President Musharrafs regime in October